Abstract: Private equity (PE) is one of the important sources of financing. The certification hypothesis associated with PE investment influences the performance during the process of going public. The listing day performance of initial public offerings (IPO) is significantly influenced by various financial intermediaries involved in the IPO process due to certification effect associated with their reputation. In this study we try to evaluate certification and grandstanding hypothesis associated with PE investors in IPO market. Our empirical results refute certification hypothesis since the PE investment does influence the IPO performance. However, the ownership stake of PE investment has negative impact on the first day of IPO performance. This supports grandstanding hypothesis where the ownership stake and the urge of PE investors in liquidating the stake determines the IPO performance. The insignificant ownership stake held by private equity investors is a consequence of regulatory constraint. The insignificant impact on long-term IPO performance is also due to insignificant ownership stake retained after IPO. In addition, it is also observed that business group affiliated firms have lower degree of IPO underpricing. The overall performance of IPO follows 'U' shape curve indicating positive performance in the short term and long-term.
Introduction
There is enormous amount of literature and empirical studies that report the underpricing of initial public offering (IPO). The degree of underpricing varies significantly across countries during different economic cycles. The literature also supports that the degree of underpricing is intentionally induced by the issuer and the underwriter to increase the probability of success of an IPO (Krigman et al., 1999; Loughran and Ritter, 2004) . Information asymmetry is identified as one of the primary reasons for underpricing of IPO. The seminal theoretical model explained by Rock (1986) shows that the information asymmetry exists among various classes of investors. This leads to mispricing the issue and results in IPO underpricing.
The involvement of various intermediaries in the process of IPO has an impact on IPO performance. The reputation of various financial intermediaries has significant influence on the degree of IPO underpricing. This is referred to as the certification effect in IPO literature. These intermediaries having larger ownership stake can potentially access the information by being insiders and are at advantage to formulate the investment strategy when the firm decides to go public. The roles of an auditor, underwriter, venture capital (VC) investors, analyst coverage and institutional affiliation are more commonly cited intermediaries that influence the degree of underpricing (Booth and Smith, 1986; Khurshed et al., 2014; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) . However, the certification impact of each of the above mentioned intermediaries differs significantly. VC backed IPOs show lower degree of underpricing having positive impact of certification (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) . However, contrary results are reported by Lee and Wahal (2004) where they found that VC backed IPOs exhibit higher degree of underpricing since quite often VCs prefer IPO as an exit strategy for the funds. The exit strategy helps in attracting the funds for VC in the future. This is one of the reasons why VC backed IPOs show higher degree of underpricing.
Private equity (PE) investors have greater ability to access and evaluate the information owing to longer association with the target firm and have better understanding of its business operations. The information asymmetry exists between PE investors and potential buyers impact the value of the firm. Higher degree of information asymmetry will result in higher risk, influencing the firm value. The decision of choice between full or partial exit by the PE investors depends upon the degree of information asymmetry (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003) . Hence, the ownership stake liquidated by PE investors through IPO indicates the degree of information asymmetry.
Since pricing of an IPO involves greater degree of information asymmetry, IPO is not the best preferred exit route by PE investors. However, PE investors may not potentially suffer due to greater degree of information asymmetry. The choice of exit route is influenced by the relationship between principal (PE investor) and the agent (management or entrepreneur). The management has an incentive to choose the IPO as an exit route rather than the trade sale (Bascha and Walz, 2001) . IPO increases the ownership dispersion and reduces the probability of existence of a single largest controlling shareholder. The absence of single controlling shareholders is seen as nonmonetary benefit for the management or entrepreneur. IPO is the most successful exit strategy for well-performing target firm (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2004) even though it does not fetch the maximum issue proceeds for the firm (Bascha and Walz, 2001) . Gompers and Lerner (1999) examined such relationship by evaluating a sample of 350 PE backed IPOs of biotechnology firms and find that PE investors opt to exit through trade sale when market value of a firm is low and exits through IPO when the firm obtains higher value. As a result, a firm going public also tries to match the market timing to issue an IPO during the time of high valuation.
The successful exit through IPO benefits PE investors even though they do not sell any shares during IPO (Barry et al., 1990) . They prefer to allocate the shares to limited partners even after lock-in period instead of selling them in the open market (Gompers and Lerner, 1998) . Selling of these shares by limited partners is followed by a sharp reaction of outside investors and results in the price fall. This is one of the reasons for observing underperformance of IPO after the lock-in expiration period.
The above mentioned studies make it evident that the PE investors choose IPO as an exit route for their investment. Hence, it is important to study the influence of PE investment on the listing day performance and long-term performance of IPO. In Indian scenario, the regulations imposed on PE investment restrict the percentage of ownership in listed companies. As a result, PE investors need to liquidate certain investment stake through IPO to adhere to the regulatory requirement. For the PE investors, exiting out from prior investment is very critical because it influences their reputation and affects their future deals. In this study we evaluate the certification hypothesis associated with the PE investors at the time of issuing IPO and on its long-term performance in Indian IPO market. Through this study we make following important contribution to the extant IPO literature. This is the first research work to evaluate the PE investment in Indian IPOs and reports U shaped curve of long-term performance of Indian IPOs by linking it to two important phenomena, namely certification hypothesis and grandstanding. Secondly, this work reveals that simple control or no control of ownership by PE investors as a reason for not having any influence on IPO underpricing. Third contribution is that the study supports insignificant role of PE investors on the degree of underpricing of IPOs that are issued by business group affiliated firms. Hence, this is the first work which deals with the role of PE investment in Indian IPOs. The study makes important contribution to the existing IPO literature by revealing that PE investment in Indian IPO market does not support certification hypothesis in determining IPO performance since they liquidate very small stake of their investment through IPO.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents literature review followed by Section 3 where we present hypothesis development. Section 4 presents data and methodology. Section 5 covers results and discussion and Section 6 concludes the study.
Literature review
The primary reason for IPO underpricing is identified as the degree of information asymmetry. There are various firm-specific attributes which influence the degree of information asymmetry and ultimately influence the degree of IPO underpricing (Katti and Phani, 2016) . The involvement of institutional investors in the ownership of the firm helps in reducing the degree of information asymmetry since they are informed investors and have an advantage of additional information over the retail investors. Therefore, the reputation of institutional investors influences the first day IPO performance. The firms having PE investors, as a part of institutional investors, have exhibited better performance as compared to other firms in first five years of listing (Brav and Gompers, 1997) . This outperformance is considered as evidence of PE backed IPOs being more underpriced (in other words on the listing day) as compared to other IPOs. Therefore, in our opinion, value misrepresentation is not an issue but they are concerned about liquidity of their investment. The high underpricing can be also seen as reputation building device for PE investor (Neus and Walz, 2005) and they are keen to establish their reputation to enter public capital market more frequently (Lin and Smith, 1998) . Sometimes, young PE investor exits earlier to maintain a good track record of successful exit as a result of 'grandstanding' phenomenon.
In European market, this phenomenon was absent as reported by Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) . Established PE investor opts for IPO as an exit route prior to the raising of follow-on funds. It indicates that IPO is one of the important routes to raise the funds for reinvestment by PE investors. The exit decision of PE investor through IPOs results in higher degree of underpricing (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Franzke, 2003; Lee and Wahal, 2004) . However, empirical study based on German firms reveals that IPOs with PE investment were relatively less underpriced though they opt for IPO as an exit route (Jelic et al., 2005) . The review of literature indicates conflicting results associated with the involvement of PE investors. The reputation of PE investor decreases degree of IPO underpricing in the USA market (Gompers, 1996; Brav and Gompers, 1997) but increases in German market (Franzke, 2003) . Reputable underwriters and auditors are attracted towards PE backed firm than other non PE backed firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) . The conflicting results are explained by the magnitude of degree of influence due to certification effect and grandstanding phenomenon. Both these phenomena are explained with the help of literature in the following subsections.
Certification effect
The certification effect associated with various types of institutional investors is evaluated by considering various financial intermediaries involved in the IPO process. The reputations of underwriter, auditors, VC investors, financial analysts and business group affiliation significantly impact the IPO performance through its certification effect. The reputation of auditors, venture capitalist and underwriters significantly influences the performance of an IPO (Beatty, 1989; Barry et al., 1990; Carter et al., 1998; Marisetty and Subrahmanyam, 2010) . Well reputed financial intermediaries are associated with lower degree of underpricing since they can access the information that they are privy to. This also reflects in accurate valuation of IPO. The reputation of these intermediaries also reflects in determining the clientele they serve. Carter et al. (1998) observed that well reputed underwriters are successful in attracting long-term investors which stabilise liquidity in the secondary market. On the other hand low reputed underwriters allocate the issue to short term investors that results in flipping activity and influence the IPO performance.
Grandstanding
PE investors are significantly involved in fund generation and reinvestment of the available fund. Therefore, liquidity of invested fund is very critical. The age of PE firm plays important role in obtaining the liquidity. The track record of successful IPO exit and the future fundraising is stronger for young PE investors and they desire to establish fame and reputation. This phenomenon of imparting liquidity to the invested funds is known as 'grandstanding'. The young investors take their portfolio companies public earlier than the established ones. In addition to the fund liquidity and reinvestment, they also have motivation to realise the return from the specific investment. The media coverage on early successful exit through IPO results into high publicity of the PE investors and helps in improving the track record (Gompers, 1996) . As a result, IPO exit contributes more towards the reputation and image building of a PE investor than any other exit routes. Hence, exit through IPO is much preferred by the young PE investors (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Gompers, 1996 and Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . The wide media coverage even after exit is sufficient enough to attract the attention of press, financial analysts and existing and/or potential investors. Exit through IPO may fetch less money but the media coverage compensates for the anticipated loss. For this reason, investor decision is biased in favour of IPO exit (Cumming and Macintosh, 2003) .
Investment of VC investors prior to exit through IPO in the US has been reported to have an investment horizon of 2-4 years (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . Many other studies are in consensus to this investment horizon and a typical investment period converges to 3 to 5 years (Lerner and Hardymon, 2002; Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007) . The involvement over the investment period potentially acts as monitoring and helps in improving the firm performance. In addition, if the PE investors are involved in the board of governance, the decisions are likely to reduce the agency cost and protect the minority shareholders.
Against this backdrop, it can be hypothesised that the impact of PE investment on IPO performance can be positive or negative. In consideration of positive certification effect (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) , the PE backed firms are likely to have lower degree of underpricing as compared to non PE backed and in support with grandstanding phenomenon it will result in higher degree of underpricing to attract the additional funds in the future. As a result, various country specific capital market conditions as well as role of regulations can influence the role of PE investors in influencing the performance of IPO.
In India, the regulations imposed on VC and PE investors differ. In addition, the process of IPO also differs in comparison with many other countries. Hence, it is critical to examine the influence of PE investment on IPO performance.
Indian scenario
The process of IPO slightly differs in Indian capital market. Currently, Indian capital market, regulator -Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has allowed two types of IPO issuance mechanisms such as fixed pricing and book building. The option of choosing either of the issue mechanism is given to an issuer. Therefore, the issuer has discretion to opt for either of the routes for IPO issuance. In addition to the IPO process, there are other unique features of Indian IPOs such as IPO grading, fixed allocation to various classes of investors, that make Indian IPOs different from other countries and important to study the impact of PE investors.
Indian businesses are characterised by family owned businesses which culminate into large business groups. The structures of business groups are observed in various countries and described with different nomenclature. Latin American business groups are known as Groupo, South Korean are famous as Chaebols, Japanese business groups are Keiretsu, business houses of India and conglomerates in US and Canada. The formation and operations of business group in each economy are based on unique feature. Keiretsu firms show greater dependency on the banking system and role of central bank has significant role in contributing towards the business performance. The bank centric economic setup brings in differentiating characteristics for business group firms in Japanese economy.
The emergence of Indian business groups is based on social, religious, ethnic ties and geographical location. Most of the business groups have larger family controlled ownership that exists in different forms such as horizontal cross holding and pyramidal structure. The business groups own majority of the productive resources in Indian economy that accounts for 70% of the total productive assets of all listed firms. The literature has identified that business group affiliated firms have differentiating characteristics and hence their performance differs as compared to stand alone firms. Khanna and Palepu (2000) reported that firms that are affiliated to business group outperform as compared to other firms. It is observed that the PE investors invest 55% of the funds in business group affiliated firms. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the performance of PE funds in business group affiliated IPOs.
A distinct characteristic of Indian regulatory framework for PE and IPO, combined with the feature of business group operation, creates a unique environment to study the performance of Indian IPO. The study analysing the influence of PE investment on the degree of underpricing and performance of IPO will enable us to evaluate if Indian PE investors act to support the certification phenomenon or follow grandstanding hypothesis.
Hypothesis development
The degree of IPO underpricing and performance both are driven by the degree of information asymmetry (Rock, 1986) . The information asymmetry predominantly exists within the investors' classes resulting in IPO underpricing. Institutional investors exhibit lower degree of information asymmetry since they have access to additional information. Owing to their expertise and reputation in the financial market, institutional investors influence the degree of IPO underpricing. Hence, the certification effect is validated with various institutional intermediaries such as underwriter, auditor and PE investors. In case of PE investors, reputation and liquidity of funds are linked. This concept is referred as grandstanding (Gompers, 1996) . Well reputed PE investors are able to reduce the degree of underpricing (Gompers, 1996; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Jelic et al., 2005) . The involvement of other intermediaries also gets influenced if the firm has raised the capital from PE investors prior to going public. PE backed IPOs potentially attract reputed underwriters (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) . PE investors tend to show early exit from their investment to signal the quality and build the reputation. The exit from current investment helps the PE investor to reinvest the funds into new venture. IPO pricing is influenced if PE investors choose IPO as an exit strategy. Any IPO that involves low reputed, young PE investors results in higher degree of underpricing (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) .
The influence of certification hypothesis and grandstanding in relation to the PE investors contradicts its effect. The certification effect associated with PE investors helps to reduce the degree of underpricing (Barry et al. 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) whereas the urge to exit through IPO will result in higher degree of underpricing for the successful exit (Lee and Wahal, 2004) . In every economy, the influence of PE investors (positive or negative) on IPO performance depends upon the magnitude of its effect through certification and/or grandstanding. In Indian economy, the investment by PE investors is likely to lead to IPO as an exit strategy since the exit through other routes is not very easy. The primary reason for this is Indian capital market has relatively lower depth. Therefore, this study has proposed following hypothesis, H1 PE backed Indian IPOs show higher degree of underpricing.
Though PE investors opt for partial exit through IPO, the remaining investment by PE investors is likely to exhibit certification effect post listing of IPO. Therefore, this study hypothesised that H2 IPOs with PE investors post listing show better performance than non PE backed IPOs.
As we mentioned the differentiating characteristics of Indian businesses, both the above mentioned hypotheses are also tested by evaluating the impact of business group affiliated firms and PE investors in business group affiliated firms. Institutional void theory supports that evolution of Indian business group is found to support the business operations which are not easily available in the country specific environment to provide all the business support which is otherwise difficult to get in these economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) . As a result, business group creates positive externalities and overcomes negative externalities from the external environment. The business group also has certification impact and acts as a moderator in determining the listing performance of IPO (Katti and Phani, 2015) . If the PE is invested in business group affiliated firm, the certification of business group and PE investors both will be likely to have positive signal to the potential investors about the IPO performance. Therefore, we hypothesise that H3 IPOs of business group affiliation with PE investment are less underpriced compared to non business group IPOs.
Data and methodology
India has seen increase in the number and size of both IPO and PE fund inflow as shown in Table 1 . PE investment at pre IPO stage plays significant role in influencing the degree of underpricing as cited in the literature with the help of certification hypothesis. Hence, the depth of capital market, the issue size of IPO and the PE investment in a firm are important determinants to impact the decision of exit. In Indian scenario, the trend in PE investment shows that the PE firms on an average hold only 18% of ownership at pre IPO as compared to 59.2% in UK (Levis, 2010) . It is also observed that IPO is not the preferred exit route for PE investors and on average, they exit only 8.5% of their stake through IPO and hold only 9.5% ownership stake post IPO. It may be due to low depth of Indian capital market. The market depth measured in terms of the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP shows that it is reported as only 55% in year 2007 which is less than the developed economy. Indian capital market regulator, SEBI is concerned about the impact of PE investors on the price and volatility observed in capital market and hence they have set the norms to control their participation. The regulatory constraint on PE investor does not allow investing more than 25% in the listed firms and not more than 10% of the total fund size in single publicly listed firm. As a consequence of this constraint the observed ownership stake in pre IPO stage and post IPO stage is limited.
In this study we considered the data of 346 Indian IPO issues between January 2004 and August 2010. The issue specific data of all these IPOs is obtained from the final draft prospectus from SEBI website. The oversubscription ratio is obtained from the Capitaline database. The prices of secondary trading, firm specific variables such as total assets, market capitalisation, group affiliation, etc. and market prices of all the securities and SENSEX are obtained from Prowess Database provided by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The details of PE investment in public going firms are obtained from PE deal database provided by Venture Intelligence.
Out of total 346 IPOs considered for the study, there are 71 firms that have raised the capital at pre IPO stage from PE investment funds. The returns are calculated by considering open price as well as close price on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). In Table 2 , we present the descriptive statistics of majority of the variables that are firm specific. The average issue size of an IPO is Rs. 3,167.6 million. The mean value of total assets of a public going firm is Rs. 25135 million with the average sales of Rs. 4,576.34 million. The mean value of degree of underpricing with opening and closing price of total sample is 23.6% and 30.0% respectively. The minimum value or degree of underpricing shows negative indicating overpricing of some of the issues. The investment by PE firms is observed in 71 IPOs. The IPO sample with PE investment shows 25.9% and without PE investment shows 31.1% of closing underpricing. Though the descriptive statistics shows that PE backed IPOs are relatively less underpriced, the difference is not statistically significant. We conducted ANOVA analysis for the same and do not find any statistical significance (Results are not reported). Table 2 represents descriptive statistics of the sample. 
Calculation of underpricing and performance of IPO
The literature supports the degree of underpricing with respect to opening price as well as closing price on the listing day. We calculated degree of underpricing by considering opening (Aggarwal, 2003) and closing prices (Derrien and Womack, 2003; Cliff and Denis, 2004; Corwin and Schultz, 2005) of IPOs on the listing day to analyse any anomalies if they exist. The opening price for IPOs is based on matching all the unexecuted orders from previous day at the time of opening of the trade. The closing price is calculated by averaging out all the orders during last 30 trades (BSE) or all the trades in the last 30 minutes (NSE). BSE and NSE are the two major exchanges in Indian capital market.
The following formula is used to quantify the degree of underpricing as percentage change of the price on listing day with respect to its offer price.
Opening Clo sin g Pr ice On Listing Offer Pr ice 100
Offer Pr ice
Underpricing Overpricing
Performance of IPO has been measured in terms of buy and hold returns (BHAR), which is natural log of ratio of their prices at end and beginning of the period considered for calculation. 
Opening clo ing Sensex on last tarding day of the period Opening clo ing Sensex on last tarding day of the period =
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression has been used to analyse the influence of different variables on underpricing and IPO performance. We considered different control variables for the analysis purpose those are commonly drawn from the relevant literature. Some of the firm specific control variables that can affect the firm performance considered in our analysis are total asset as a proxy for firm size, borrowing and firm age at the time of listing. Some other issue specific control variables are issue size, oversubscription ratio and time period of the issuance. The dependent variables are based on our hypothesis and focus of the study is PE investment, business group diversification which is quantified same as reported by Khanna and Palepu (2000) and number of PE investors referred as PE syndication. The variables such as issue time period (hot and cold), business group affiliation and PE investment are categorical variables.
In years 2006 and 2007, the numbers of IPOs were high and hence this period is considered as hot market period represented with 1 and otherwise as 0. Business group affiliated firms are assigned 1 otherwise 0 and if firm is backed with PE investment then 1 otherwise 0.
Following are OLS regression equations used for estimation of underpricing and performance of IPO.
• Underpricing of IPO 
Following are the notations used for different variable for OLS regression.
• Raffiliation = business group affiliation (1 for yes otherwise 0)
• Sales = total annual sales in issue year (in INR millions)
• TotalAsset = total assets of the firm in issue year (in INR millions)
• Debt = total debt of the firm in issue year (in INR millions)
• PEInvestment = investment by PE investors (1 for yes otherwise 0)
• IssueSize = IPO issue size (in INR millions)
• Oversubscription = oversubscription ratio of IPO
• AgeOfListing = age in years at the time of listing of the firm
• IssuePeriod = period in which IPO has been issued (cold and hot period)
• GroupDiversification = degree of diversification of business group
• DERatio = debt to equity ratio of the firm in IPO issue year
• TobinQ = Tobin's Q of the firm in IPO issue year
• PESynsdication = number of PE investors of a firm at time of IPO
• PreIPOownership = ownership of PE investor before IPO (%)
• PostIPOownership = ownership of PE investor after IPO (%)
• DifferencePreAnd PostIPOownership = difference between ownership of PE investor before and after IPO (%).
Results and discussion
The results are reported to analyse the degree of underpricing and performance of IPOs in the following section.
Degree of underpricing
Under the univariate test the sample is divided based on IPOs that are supported with and without PE investment. The test results indicate that the degree of underpricing (first day return) does not show any significant difference based on the firm having capital raised from PE investors. This indicates that in Indian capital market PE backed firms do not show any differentiating character of IPO underpricing in comparison with non PE backed firms (the results are not reported). The methodology of OLS regression by considering degree of underpricing (first day return) as a dependent variable and various other firm-specific variables as listed in Tables 3 and 4 exhibits following important findings.
The results of regression analysis with degree of underpricing as a dependent variable are presented in Table 3 . In the first three models, we consider dependent variable as opening underpricing and next three models the dependent variable is closing underpricing. In this analysis, we consider few issue specific control variables such as issue size and oversubscription (demand) are found positively significant in determining the listing day performance (degree of underpricing). The excess demand results in oversubscription. High oversubscription limits the allocation (rationing the shares). Hence the investors who are not able to get the allocation through the IPO try to obtain it from the secondary market on the listing day driving the prices up in the secondary market. This increase in the share price in the secondary market on the listing day influences the degree of underpricing. The larger issues and higher demand results in higher degree of underpricing.
In Table 3 , model 1 we consider PE investment and business group affiliation as explanatory variables. The results indicate that PE investment is insignificant in determining the degree of underpricing. However, business group affiliation of a firm is observed negatively significant in determining the degree of underpricing. It indicates that IPOs of business group affiliated firms are less underpriced when we consider PE investment. This result contradicts with the results reported earlier by Marisetty and Subrahmanyam (2010) . However, their study does not control for PE investment. Therefore, our results are more robust. 
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.000*** Notes: ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Table 3 presents the linear regression models of underpricing based on opening and closing price on one day for sample 268. It has dependent variable underpricing with open and close price. Total asset is the total asset of an IPO issuing firm in a listing year (Rs. million). Ln debt is the natural log of debt of the firm in a listing year. Ln issue size is the natural log of IPO issue size. Ln over subscription is the natural log of oversubscription ratio of IPO. Ln age of listing is the natural log of age at the time of listing of the firm. Period dummy is the dummy of period in which IPO has been issued (cold and hot period). Raffiliation is the business group affiliation takes value of 1 if the firm is affiliated to business group otherwise 0. PE investment is the dummy of investment takes value of 1 for the IPOs that have PE investment otherwise 0. No. of PE syndication is the number of PE investors at the time of IPO. InteractionRAffiliationXPE is the interaction variable of business group affiliation and PE investment.
In model 2, we consider syndicate size of PE investors and observe that though actual PE investment does not influence the first day IPO return significantly, the size of syndication shows positive significance. It indicates that if the PE investment is done by multiple investors, in that case large number of PE investors result in greater degree of underpricing. Large number of investors is likely to compete among them to liquidate their stake through IPO and hence results in greater degree of underpricing. In model 3 we add interaction of PE investment and business group affiliation and do not find any support in observing the significance of PE investment in business group firms in determining IPO underpricing. We run similar models for degree of underpricing with closing prices and do find any difference in the results as that of the one that we observed with opening prices. On the basis of these results, we refute our hypothesis 1 and can interpret that PE investment made prior to listing does not have significant role in determining the degree of IPO underpricing. However, group affiliation influence positively in lowering the degree IPO underpricing. PE investment in business group affiliated firms does not make any significant impact on the degree of underpricing. Therefore, we also refute our hypothesis 3.
Performance of IPO
The literature supports that pre IPO capital structure as well as ownership structure influences the performance of a firm in the secondary market. If the firm has received capital from VC and if VC decides to exit through IPO, then they normally give away their stake to their limited partner. Limited partners normally sell off their shares immediately in the secondary market. This is one of the plausible reasons why IPOs underperform after the expiration of lock in period (Bradley et al., 2001) . As a result, the trading volume in the secondary market increases for the firm that has been financed by VCs after the expiration of lock in period (Field and Hanka, 2001 ). The study of long-term performance of IPO shows that the IPO returns are comparable to the market return (Gompers and Lerner, 2003) . In many countries, the PE investors have larger stake of investment having controlling rights and are considered as promoters. However literature is silent on linking up the ownership stake of PE investors. Based on the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2 , we observe that in Indian scenario, the ownership stake held by PE investors is quite less. Hence, in India PE investors are not considered as promoters and the shareholding stake after IPO is not necessarily locked in for stipulated period. This study examines the impact of PE investment on IPO performance in short term, medium term and long-term by considering open return as well as close return for different periods. Table 4 shows descriptive results of the same. Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. Based on focus of our study in testing hypothesis 2, we run multivariate regression model to evaluate the influence of PE investment on the short term, medium term and long-term performance of IPO. Table 5 presents the multivariate regression model in determining the IPO return based on closing prices. The results are presented for returns determined for six month, year 1 to year 4. The regression results align with our short term returns, not showing significant impact of PE investment on long-term IPO return. These results do not substantiate certification hypothesis associated with PE investors for Indian IPOs. Similarly, the certification effect of business group also disappears in determining short term, medium term and long-term IPO performance. The interaction effect of PE investment and business group is also found insignificant in influencing the IPO return. The number of PE investors in the form of size of syndication shows negative significance only for one year return. The negative significant relation is likely due to exit opportunities that the PE investors are looking for around one year, in support of grandstanding hypothesis. Based on these results, we refute our hypothesis 2. Notes: ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. Table 6 presents the linear regression models for degree of underpricing for PE backed IPOs for different samples. It has dependent variable underpricing of open and close price. Tobin Q is the Tobin Q's of the firm in IPO issue year. Ln total asset is the natural log of total asset of the firm in issue year. Ln sales are the natural log of total annual sales in issue year. Ln over subscription is the natural log of oversubscription ratio of IPO. Ln issue size is the natural log of IPO issue size. Ln pre ownership is the natural log of pre ownership (%). No. of PE syndication is the number of PE investors of a firm at time of IPO. Raffiliation is the affiliation of business group.
In Table 6 , we present OLS regression results in understanding the importance of ownership stake of PE investment in determining the degree of IPO underpricing. In model 1 we consider pre IPO ownership stake of PE investors and find it negatively significant. This result indicates that higher ownership of PE investors results in greater degree of underpricing thus supporting the evidence that larger investment by PE investors will lead to greater urge to exit through IPO and will result in degree of underpricing. This evidence supports that in India PE investors support grandstanding hypothesis as opposed to certification hypothesis. These results substantiate the insignificance of PE investment in determining the degree of IPO underpricing. The results presented in Table 6 coupled with the data description in Table 2 reveal that the magnitude of the ownership stake is significantly important. Indian IPOs exhibit only 18% of ownership stake which may not be significant enough to have an influence on the degree of underpricing. In addition, the table also indicates that the PE investors liquidate only little stake through IPO. This indicates that Indian PE investors do not prefer IPO as major exit strategy since their investment stake is not very substantial. The results do not change by considering the degree of underpricing with the help of closing prices.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed influence of PE financing on the degree of underpricing and performance of IPO. It has been shown that PE financing does not impact IPO underpricing. The certification hypothesis associated with PE investors is not supported. However, grandstanding can potentially hold true since the PE investors show evidence of partial exit through IPO. PE firms do not hold enough ownership to have any controlling rights in the Indian firm. The study reveals this as one of the critical reasons for not having significant impact of PE investment on the degree of underpricing and long-term IPO performance. In addition, the percentage of ownership that is liquidated by PE investor through IPO route is very low. The results on ownership stake show serious policy implications on the performance of IPO. The business group affiliation helps to reduce the degree of IPO underpricing, but does not show any significant impact on the short term, medium term and long-term IPO performance. In addition, PE investment in business group affiliated firms does not have any significant impact on IPO performance. Another redeeming feature noted is that Indian IPOs follow U curve and show positive performance in the short term as well in the long-term. As a result, investors will benefit by investing in IPO either for short term or long-term.
